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INTRODUCTION

Political Questions, Judicial
Questions, and the Problem
of Washington v Glucksberg
Carl E. Schneider

Over a century and a half ago, Alexis de Tocqueville famously said, "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that
is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." Physician-assisted
suicide superbly illustrates Tocqueville's acute observation. For a number of
years, assisted suicide was the prototype of a (nonpartisan) political question. Interest groups brought it to public attention. Public discussion of it
flourished. Legislatures debated it. Citizens in several states decided in referenda whether to make it legal. Almost suddenly, however, this classic political process was transformed into a judicial one by the startling and
strongly stated opinions of the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals.
These opinions bid fair to take the power of decision away from political institutions by finding in the constitutional right of privacy an entitlement to
the help of a physician in committing suicide. Now, in a case called Washington v Glucksberg (and, of course, its companion case, Vacco v Quill), the
Supreme Court has reversed the decisions of the Second and Ninth Circuits.
When the political becomes judicial, the nature of the debate changes
in crucial ways. In particular, the debate falls into the hands oflawyers, and
discourse is limited to the arguments that are cognizable by the law. What is
more, judicial opinions evoke considerably different-and considerably more
difficult-kinds of responses from states, the other classic form of legal expression. For example, in evaluating a statute, we principally ask whether it
produces a socially desirable result. In evaluating a judicial opinion, we principally ask whether the court reached the result required by law. The task of
legislatures and referenda has generally been to decide whether assisted suicide is good public policy; the Supreme Court had only to decide whether
the Constitution requires states to permit it. Almost everyone may reasonably have an opinion about what constitutes good public policy in matters of
ordinary experience; it is hard to know what the Constitution requires unless you are familiar with a gruesomely large body of precedent.
There are other differences. For instance, a statute frequently attempts
to address a problem completely and-the legislature usually hopes-with
something like finality. A court is ordinarily obliged to decide only the case in
front ofit, and it is commonly thought that a narrow basis of decision is to be
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preferred to a broad one. Thus state statutes have either prohibited assisted
suicide or, in Oregon, established a regime permitting and regulating it. In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit opinion establishing a right to assisted suicide
would have left many questions about the scope of the right and of governmental regulation to be decided through a combination oflegislation and adjudication comparable to the quarter-century-long process in which the nature of the right to abortion has been worked out. Even the Supreme Court's
opinion in Glucksberg, which declined to find a right to assisted suicide, is
avowedly not final. Various Justices intimated in various ways that their
views might change if litigants formulated their claim differently or if new
evidence about how assisted suicide might work arose.
When a political issue becomes a judicial one, public interest in it does
not end, of course. What is more, political activity surrounding it rarely ends
either. Interested people may hope to change the judicial result. Sometimes
they proceed judicially by trying to persuade the court either to overrule itself expressly or to erode its precedent by reinterpreting it. Sometimes they
try to find room in the judicial decision for legislative and social countermeasures. This often means that the political and the judicial become so
much intertwined that any person interested in a social policy must understand the judicial approach to it.
Unhappily, that understanding is too often hard to come by. As I have
just explained, the judicial approach to political problems and the language
courts employ in discussing them will often seem arcane, abstruse, and artificial to the laity. Even though America is an exceptionally judicialized country, the constraints, purposes, and discourse characteristic of courts are
widely misunderstood. For example, even journalists who specialize in covering courts tend to see judicial holdings as simple, unabashed expressions
of opinions about the relative merits of contending social policies. To be
sure, there is a good deal of expert writing about judicial decisions, but it is
ordinarily hidden away in law reviews and judicial opinions where the laity
cannot easily find it, and too often it is also hidden away in language the laity
cannot easily penetrate.
In short, a world in which the political and the judicial interact needs a
discourse that makes sophisticated explanation and criticism of judicial
opinions available to the public that is concerned with the political questions
that have become confided to courts. It was to help provide this explanation
and criticism that the University of Michigan Law School and the University
of Michigan Program in Society and Medicine sponsored a conference on
Glucksberg on November 14-15, 1997, only a few months after the case was
decided. One goal of the conference was to solicit views from people of varied backgrounds, and the participants thus included a physician, a medical
historian, and a medical sociologist. Even the lawyers had diverse experiences. Two were conventional lawyer-bioethicists, one had been a genetic
counselor, one was an expert in criminal procedure and constitutional law,

Introduction · 3

one was a Ph.D. in economics who specializes in antitrust law, and one was
an English scholar of comparative law.
The papers given at this conference-which this volume publishesundertook several tasks. They (1) asked what the Supreme Court's opinion
in Glucksberg means as a judicial decision that is part of a continuing political process; (2) criticized the opinion as a piece of legal analysis, as a social
document, and as a set of principles for the practice of medicine; (3) reflected on the principles that should animate legal thinking about assisted
suicide; and (4) discussed the way institutional authority to decide questions
of public policy should be allocated among and wielded by governmental institutions.
This volume begins its work in part I by setting Glucksberg in the context in which it arose. Part I, that is, contains a chapter that offers a brief description of how social practices surrounding the end of life and the law regulating decisions at the end of life have developed. In particular, chapter 1
tells the story of Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health, a pivotal
decision in which the Supreme Court first opened the door to the possibility
that the Constitution speaks to the way law may attempt to govern medical
decisions. In addition, chapter 1 outlines some of the basic legal issues
Glucksberg raises.
Part II undertakes the difficult work of explaining the opinions in
Glucksberg. First, what do the opinions actually say? One might expect this
question to be completely straightforward. One would be pitiably mistaken.
In this case, the Court was necessarily working on complex and controversial legal ground, and the Justices thus had some difficulty in deciding what
they thought and in saying what they meant. Second, part II asks what
Glucksberg means as a precedent. Might the Court later change its mind?
Does Glucksberg entirely remove courts from supervising decisions at the
end of life? Third, was Glucksberg correct as a matter of constitutional law?
These decisions fall within one of the most mysterious areas of constitutional
jurisprudence-the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "liberty"-and
thus raise momentous questions about whether the Court interpreted the
Constitution and its own doctrine correctly and even about the legitimacy of
the Court's power to act.
Two chapters engage these questions. Chapter 2 is by Sonia Suter-a
promising young legal scholar whose writing on the intersection between law
and medicine is given depth by her experience as a genetic counselor. She
undertook to provide the volume's basic exposition and analysis of the opinions in Glucksberg. Her article vividly reveals a problem that almost invariably characterizes judicial treatments of political problems-that judicial
opinions are tentative, tenebrous, partial, and ambiguous. The Justices in
Glucksberg unanimously agreed that the lower court should be reversed. But
Ms. Suter probes beyond the apparent unanimity of the Justices and sees
ambivalence about assisted suicide, the state's interests in regulating it, and
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even the legitimacy of the Court's authority to supervene the state's regulations.
Judicial ambivalence and disagreement and the ambiguous opinions to
which they give rise lead to controversies over what the opinions say about
the law today and bode for the law tomorrow. There is an element of the artificial in these exercises in explication de texte. After all, the Justices generally do not draft their own opinions and are often unfamiliar with the problems under adjudication. Thus reading their opinions for hints about what is
on their minds is quite futile. On the other hand, the opinions have both judicial meaning and political meaning. They have judicial meaning because
the language in the opinions becomes law at least formally; they have political meaning exactly because of the political power the Court's moral authority generates (and because of the popular misunderstanding that the
Court pronounces on the merits of public policy).
For these reasons, the antagonists in the assisted-suicide debate started
spinning the opinions even before they were announced to turn judicial pronouncement into political benediction. Chapter 3 both criticizes this process
at its worst and exemplifies it at its best. That chapter is by Yale Kamisar,
who is the foremost student of the law of euthanasia. Since 1958, when he
published his first article on the subject, Professor Kamisar has energetically
attacked proposals to make euthanasia easier, and today he is one of the
most vociferous critics of assisted suicide. He shows in shrewd detail how
proponents of assisted suicide have tried to transform what looked like the
setback of Glucksberg into a step forward. He then lustily argues point by
point that-however ambivalent the Justices may be-Glucksberg was a crucial victory for opponents of assisted suicide. However, while Professor
Kamisar is parti pris, he is a fair-minded lawyer, and he subtly examines the
possibility that Glucksberg may contain the seeds of future judicial intervention in the law at the end of life-as by creating some kind of constitutional
right to palliative care.
Professor Kamisar's discussion implicitly deals with another problemthat the judicialization of politics politicizes the judicial process. A century
ago Mr. Dooley memorably averred that the Supreme Court follows the election returns, and half a century ago during the fight over Roosevelt's proposal to "pack" the Court someone wittily remarked of the Court's sudden
acquiescence in New Deal legislation, "A switch in time saves nine." More
recently and relevantly, the Court's travails with race and abortion have
given it reasons to think carefully about its political power and position. Professor Kamisar's discussion shows how questions about the Court's response
to the political situation in which it works may have affected its choices in
Glucksberg.
Part II, then, investigates Glucksberg's meaning for the law and politics.
Part III expands that investigation to look more directly at how Glucksberg
seems to have been understood and now is likely to influence medical practice at the end of life. Rebecca Dresser, the author of chapter 4, is a leading
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lawyer-bioethicist. A professor of both law and medicine, she examines the
opinions in Glucksberg to decipher its meaning for the way doctors may treat
patients and patients may refuse treatment. Her chapter suggests how complex policy-making has become in an age of judicialized politics. The Court
in Glucksberg declined to make assisted suicide a constitutional right, and it
expressly commended the political process as a means of writing rules for assisted suicide. But Professor Dresser suggests that Glucksberg in fact stirs
doubt about the constitutional status of several practices at the border between life and death. Llke Professor Kamisar, for example, she speculates
that the Court may have announced some kind of right to palliative care.
More, she shows how ambiguous apparently clear principles become when
they meet the realities of clinical practice.
But Professor Dresser's argument goes yet further. She announces a
theme that several other chapters will pursue. She suggests that decisions at
the end of life are ultimately most affected not by the law but by the attitudes
of doctors and their patients. In other words, she raises the question
whether law itself-whether born of political deliberation or judicial decision-can effectively regulate behavior about which people feel deeply and
which takes place far from the observation of the state. In short, one reading
of Professor Dresser's chapter sees Glucksberg as a case in which the judiciary nominally declines to intervene in the political process but in which it
can hardly help making policy even while it cannot truly affect practice.
Howard Brody, the author of chapter 5, is a physician who has been one
of the principal advocates of assisted suicide. In his chapter, Brody asks how
well the courts have understood clinical practices at the end of life and modern bioethical views of them. He suggests that two ethical ideas have been
central to clinical practice at the end of life in the United States: the principle that there is a moral difference between refusing treatment and committing suicide, and the principle that a physician may legitimately treat a
patient's pain even when that treatment seems likely to cause the patient's
death. He argues that the Second and Ninth Circuits seemed not to have
achieved an adequate comprehension either of the clinical status of these
ideas nor the ideas themselves. While he is relieved that the Supreme Court
"at least wiped the slate clean," he concludes that it failed to announce "any
superior view" and that the Justices generally seemed to have only a poor
sense of the bioethical arguments at issue in the case. Llke Professor Dresser
(indeed, like virtually all the participants on both sides of the debate), Dr.
Brody is centrally concerned that dying patients receive capable and kind
medical treatment. He believes such care is likeliest when doctors accept
the two principles he discusses, and he is troubled that courts have had so
much difficulty appreciating them.
Part IV takes us from discussions of what Glucksberg means for courts,
for legislatures, and for clinical practice to questions about how institutional
authority should be distributed and wielded in a democracy in which the political so regularly becomes judicial. Christopher McCrudden, the author of
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chapter 6, is a distinguished English authority on comparative and international law. He meticulously examines the way courts throughout the world
have assessed claims of a right to assisted suicide. He finds that it is becoming common practice for courts to rely on the authority of foreign courts and
a developing international understanding of human rights. He demonstrates
that the United States Supreme Court has been a conspicuous exception to
these trends. His discussion thus raises some provocative questions about
the judicialization of political issues. Is that process a desirable, even a necessary, way of giving effect to some transcendent vision of human rights?
What happens to the principle of democratic government when courts interpret their country's statutes and constitutions in light of supranational
standards?
In chapter 7, I use the example of assisted suicide to examine directly
the desirability and even the legitimacy of resolving political issues judicially.
I argue that judges are poorly suited by training for such tasks, that little in
the working of courts or in the doctrines at their disposal properly equips
them to make informed and wise decisions, and that there is no reason to
think that the democratic organs of government will not reach decisions that
are at least as sound. In addition, I use the chapter to offer readers a detailed
survey of what otherwise might be missing from the volume-the arguments
about states' interests in regulating assisted suicide that have been so central
in both the political and judicial debates over assisted suicide.
In asserting authority to resolve the kind of political issue at stake in
Glucksberg, courts have more or less directly consulted views about both the
morality of assisted suicide and the legitimate scope of governmental power
over intimate decisions. Part V, then, examines these issues from several
perspectives. In chapter 8, Martin Pernick, a prominent medical historian,
takes us back to the beginning of this century and the fascinating story of a
physician and filmmaker who advocated euthanasia of the "unfit." Professor
Pemick delicately explores the light this story sheds on our present concerns
about slippery slopes, the claims of medical authority, and the cultural debates over issues like assisted suicide.
No small part of the criticism of the transformation of the political into
the judicial has arisen from unhappiness about the courts' ability to formulate satisfactory principles for resolving cases. In chapter 9, Peter Hammer,
a young legal scholar who is also an economist, undertakes an ambitious
project-reconsidering the conventional judicial understanding of the way
courts should conceptualize conflicts between the individual and the community. This prqject is an important attempt to stretch beyond the limits and
exhaustion of the conventional understanding. Professor Hammer proposes
a new analytic framework based on the ways individuals think about their
own interests and social interests and on the way society may think about its
own interests and those of its members. The challenge he raises is whether
courts may be able to use this framework for reaching some wise resolution
of the problems assisted suicide presents.
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Chapter 10 is by Arthur Frank, a sociologist who had cancer and who
has since then devoted himself to talking with patients and studying their
narratives of illness. His essay takes us past the generalities and abstractions
that so often characterize the discourse of both political and judicial institutions to the patients, families, friends, and doctors whose lives and deaths
are the real stuff of the assisted-suicide debate. For Frank, questions about
whether that debate should be resolved politically or judicially fade into insignificance. He doubts that satisfactory answers to the human realities can
come from law at all (although he also presents an imaginative proposal of
his own for the law at the end of life).
In chapter 11, I try to explain why Frank and the other contributors who
wonder about the law's ability to regulate medical decisions at the end of life
wisely may be right and to return us to Tocqueville's reflection on American
life and law. Tocqueville said that when every political issue becomes judicial, political discussion must adopt the language of the law. In my essay, I
suggest that that language is often inapt for issues like assisted suicide. Such
issues ask us to think about what is right for one individual at one moment.
But law is a system of social regulation that must make general rules for
many people over long periods and that must be concerned for the regularity of its own procedures and the coherence ofits own doctrines. This is law's
strength and virtue. Nevertheless, it means that what law must say and what
people should do may often be unhappily different. Thus, this essay suggests
that the judicialization of politics raises questions not just about judicial
competence and authority, but also about the way we discuss political and
moral issues.
The volume closes with two judicial opinions-that of the Ninth Circuit
in Compassion in Dying v Washington and that of the Supreme Court in
Washington v Glucksberg. They are here to give the reader the texts on
which the essays in this volume comment (for however judicialized our politics, basic judicial texts are usually not adequately available even to interested lay readers). I reprint these opinions for another reason as well. This is
not a book about whether it is right or wrong for doctors to help patients
commit suicide or even about whether it is good policy to make assisted suicide a crime. It is a book about the efforts of our federal courts to decide
what role they should play in decisions about assisted suicide. One of the
contributors is an eminent opponent of assisted suicide, another an eminent
proponent. (The rest of the contributors had not written about the topic and
were invited partly for that reason.) The reader, however, may want a
clearer statement of the underlying arguments for and against assisted suicide. The Ninth Circuit's opinion is the most aggressiv~ne might even say
combative-defense of a right to assisted suicide imaginable. The Supreme
Court's opinion is a less adamant but still plain rebuttal of that argument.

